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In 1986, what was then the Agricultural Cooperative Service commissioned nine papers 
on cooperative theory to stimulate research and creative thought on the practical aspects 
and current problems of cooperation. These outstanding papers were published the 
following year as Cooperative Theory:  New Approaches, Jeffrey Royer, ed.   
Three of the 9 essays were written by John Staatz of Michigan State University, 
and were extensions of his award winning Ph.D. dissertation, “A Theoretical Perspective 
on the Behavior of Farmers’ Cooperatives.”  Staatz’ prescient paper, “The Structural 
Characteristics of Farmer Cooperatives and their Behavioral Consequences,” outlined 
three distinguishing characteristics of farmer marketing cooperatives and developed 
hypothesis based on these attributes regarding how the behavior of cooperatives is 
different from that of investor-owned firms (IOFs).   
Staatz traced out the implied behavioral consequences of these differences with 
respect to farmer-member participants in cooperatives.   Within this context, the “Horizon 
Problem” is described and explained as a consequence of the general illiquidity of 
cooperative stock derived from the fundamental characteristic that shareholders in 
cooperatives accrue ownership benefits almost exclusively through their current 
patronage and not equity.  
New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) were designed principally to overcome the 
shortcomings of the farmer-marketing-cooperative structure and its behavioral 
consequences while maintaining the principles and derived benefits of collective action.   
One of the major attributes of the NGC is that the benefits of ownership accrue 
extensively through members’ equity investment along with their patronage.  Just as with 
IOFs, a well-functioning secondary market ensures the liquidity of the cooperative’s 
stock certificates and confers on the bearer the expected present value of the firm’s future 
earnings.   
The absence however, of a secondary market for NGC stock reduces ownership 
benefits to be obtained exclusively, once again, through current patronage.  Rationally 
behaving NGC members subjected to these constraints on equity accrual are expected to 
pressure the cooperative to increase current earnings at the expense of future 
investment/earnings; the “horizon problem.”   
This paper explores the premise that the sale of Minnesota Corn Processors 
(MCP), among the first of the New Generation Cooperatives, to Archer Daniels Midland 
in 2002 was motivated principally by the horizon problem that had beset the membership 
as a consequence of a virtual absence of any secondary market for the cooperative’s 
stock.  The sale of MCP to ADM was in fact an extreme case whereby, the tendency of 
emphasizing current cash flow at the expense of future earnings was executed by a total 
liquidation of assets.  Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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The Old Co-op Ways  
 
Farmer Co-ops are just “Different” 
Farmer cooperatives are different from other businesses, especially with regard to 
their decision making.  And on a more fundamental level, there are structural 
characteristics, in the way co-ops are organized and the way they operate, that set them 
apart from other types of firm.   
 
Patron-Stockholder identity  
For one thing, the farmer-stockholders of a cooperative are also the major users of 
the firm’s services.  To the extent that stockholder-members influence the firm’s decision 
making, this adds a messy complication to the firm’s objective function.  As Staatz said, 
it has the effect of “broadening and diffusing the scope of optimization across the entire 
membership of the cooperative.”  (July 1987)   
 
Broader and More Diffuse Scope for Optimization 
  The scope for optimization is broader in the sense that a profit-maximizing 
farmer-member will seek to manage the farm and cooperative as an integrated 
farm/cooperative system.  It is more diffuse because cooperative returns are distributed 
according to patronage.  Consequently, the cooperative has not one profit maximizing 
point, but a separate point for each member of the cooperative.   
  In a multi-product cooperative this is of particular consequence because 
stockholder-patrons are especially concerned about the pricing of individual products 
more so than in the firm’s overall performance.   In contrast to the investor-owned-firm  
(IOF), where the stockholder derives income based on the firm’s bottom line, a 
cooperative stockholder’s income depends more on the pricing of individual products 
than on the firm’s overall profitability. 
  Issues of product pricing, pooling, and cost allocation, are therefore, matters of 
particular concern among cooperative stockholders because of their income distribution 
consequences.  And when members face financial straights, their interests in these issues 
grow keener still.  
 
Democratic governance  
Voting Limits on Equity Ownership 
A second characteristic is that the governance of the cooperative business is 
structured democratically, as in “one-member, one-vote”, so that voting power is not 
proportional to the stockholder’s equity investment.  The allocation of voting power 
based NOT on equity ownership is intended to separate the control of the organization 
from the contribution of capital, the so-called “Principle of Preventing the Domination of 
Capital” in the cooperative.  This diffusion of capital power however, raises the 
possibility that a majority of small contributing patrons could impose policies that exploit 
the minority of large contributing members.  
  Of greater concern is the possibility that the diffusion of political power may 
reduce the quality of the board of directors’ decision making.  When board members 
believe their reelection is dependent on a majority of patrons each with a relatively small 
stake in the cooperative, they may regard decisions more cavalierly than when voting 
rights are proportional to equity investment.     Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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Limits on Non-stockholders Serving on Board 
 In an effort to insure “member control,” there are strict limitations on the number 
of nonmembers who may serve on the board of directors.   
Board members of a farmer cooperative are users of the firm’s services and 
therefore, bring concerns to the board from an owner’s standpoint as well as that of a 
user.  An owner’s concern is focused on the security and overall profitability of the 
stockholder’s investment.  A user is concerned with issues which affect the profitability 
of the cooperative to the individual patron.    
User concerns generally are given priority in a marketing cooperative because of 
the limitation of dividend payments and the inability to accrue capital gains.  And as 
users of the co-op’s services, board members may bring an important technical 
understanding of the firm’s operations.   
However, when cooperative operations are complex and reach well up the 
marketing chain, a farmer-director is less likely to have the deep skills necessary to make 
sound business decisions and lead the co-op wisely.  This leads us to Helmberger’s 
dilemma, “To the extent that farmers participate in leadership roles in the board, they 
may contribute to poor decisions and hamstring management; to the extent that they do 
not participate, ownership is separated from control.” (Helmberger) 
 
Return on investment gained through patronage 
No secondary market for stock 
  The stock certificates of an IOF confer to its holders a residual claim in perpetuity 
on the earnings of that firm.  A secondary market values the stock in terms of its expected 
present value of the firm’s future net earnings.  And the capitalized value of those future 
earnings may be realized any time its holder desires, simply by selling the stock.   
  In contrast, a stock certificate of a marketing cooperative grants the holder a 
residual claim on the firm’s earnings only so long as the holder continues patronage in 
the co-op.  That certificate has no secondary market.  And the future earnings of the 
cooperative have little effect on its stock value.  Any equity retirement policies confer 
only a fixed claim to be paid in nominal terms over several years.  As a consequence, the 
benefits of ownership in a marketing cooperative accrue to its shareholders through their 
current patronage.  
 
Under-financing the Cooperative  
  Farmer-members therefore, invest in an agricultural cooperative to obtain the 
right to patronize the firm.  And because no real dividend is paid on the amount of equity 
invested, as long as it is profitable for a farmer to patronize the cooperative, the return on 
investment can be raised by expanding participation relative to the investment.  Left 
unchecked, members only contribute enough capital to gain entry and then expand 
patronage only so long as it is more profitable to do so.   
To overcome this behavior, cooperatives have developed programs such as: 
‘capital retains’, ‘base capital plans’, and other ways of withholding (allocation) 
patronage refunds.  These mechanisms basically force members to align their capital 
contributions with their patronage in the cooperative.  
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Limited Pool of Equity Capital  
  A fundamental consequence of tying stock ownership to patronage is that it 
severely constrains the potential pool of equity capital for the cooperative.  Investor 
owned firms may raise additional equity capital by selling stock to the general public.  
But a marketing cooperative can only increase its equity base by conscripting additional 
capital from its existing shareholders or by recruiting new farmer-members.   
 
Risk Aversion 
Existing members of a marketing cooperative resist further subscription of capital 
for a number of reasons.   
First of all, as farmers, marketing cooperative members have a limited amount of 
investment capital to start with and so must ration their investment first to their own 
enterprise to continue operations.  And even during flush periods, members tend to 
perceive that the return on investment from their own enterprise is greater than the return 
from their investment in the cooperative.   
Secondly, members invest in the cooperative hoping to strengthen their own farm 
business.  But each additional dollar invested in the cooperative represents a deepening or 
concentration of that member’s financial commitment to the business and not a 
diversification of the member’s portfolio.    
Recognizing this deeper financial commitment of their members, cooperatives 
give greater regard to the fixed costs of their shareholder-patrons than they otherwise 
might.  Therefore, marketing co-ops tend to concentrate their investments in the 
agribusiness activities that support the farming enterprises of their membership.   
This is self preserving behavior.  Members would suffer substantial capital losses 
if their farming activities were inadequately supported.  But it also serves to further 
concentrate the cooperative’s financial commitment to immobile assets.   
Recognizing that “all their eggs are in one basket,” cooperative members tend to 
pressure management to adopt more conservative, risk averse, business strategies.  By 
way of contrast, IOFs may choose to diversify into completely unrelated investments.  
And whereas an IOF stockholder is free to liquidate any investment that fails to yield its 
expected return, a farmer-shareholder’s investment in the cooperative is sunk.   
 
 
Implications for Participant Behavior: The Horizon Problem Explained 
 
These three characteristics:  the patron-stockholder identity, democratic 
governance, and the distribution of ownership benefits through patronage, lead farmer 
cooperatives to behave differently than other types of firm.  And while some of the 
behavioral differences can benefit the co-op’s operations, others are recognized to hinder 
its performance under certain circumstances.  Writings on worker-managed firms (Jensen 
and Meckling) and later on farmer-marketing cooperatives (Condon and Vitaliano, 
Furubotn) discuss how the lack of a secondary market in ownership rights leads members 
to pressure the cooperative’s decision makers to increase current earnings even if it 
means foregoing future revenues.  This tendency to emphasize current cash flow at the 
expense of future earnings is called the “horizon problem.” 
A marketing cooperative is said to have a horizon problem when its members 
pressure management to: Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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1) Increase the proportion of cooperative’s current payments to members relative 
to investment, i.e. a larger “cash payout”;  
2) Speed up equity retirement programs and/or increase the dividend paid on 
capital invested in the organization; or 
3) Liquidate the cooperative’s assets, in whole or in part. 
The horizon problem may be mitigated somewhat however, if membership in the 
cooperative can be sold with the farm.  Selling the membership allows the expected 
future earnings of the cooperative to be capitalized into the farm’s sales value.  This 
valuation/capitalization is even more straightforward when the farm is incorporated and 
the corporation itself is a member of the cooperative.  
The horizon problem may also be attenuated if the cooperative provides for an 
inter-generational transfer of membership within families.  Whether retiring members 
derive satisfaction from bequeathing their heirs a stronger cooperative or gain a higher 
retirement from the associated, the effect is the same -- Older members are more willing 
to help finance the long-term investments of the cooperative even though they will not 
benefit directly from them. 
  If the cooperative has a completely open membership policy, then the value of the 
cooperative may also be fully capitalized into a farm’s sales value. 
  In smaller cooperatives, particularly those in which the members are strongly tied 
to one another, whether by common religious or other social beliefs, the horizon problem 
may be diminished by older members’ moral obligation to their predecessors to leave a 
stronger cooperative to their heirs.   
 
Conditions for an EXTREME Horizon Problem 
  We expect then for members to put the most pressure on a cooperative’s decision 
makers to increase current payments at the expense of future earnings when the expected 
value of the cooperative may not be fully realized.    
Under the following circumstances, a cooperative is said to have an Extreme 
Horizon problem: 
1)  The per-member capital investment in the cooperative is large. 
2)  The cooperative has a closed membership. 
3)  Few of the member firms are legally incorporated. 
4)  The intergenerational transfer of membership within families is prohibited. 
5)  The cooperative has a large, diverse membership. 
 
The “New Wave” Response 
The “new generation” cooperatives were intended to offer an alternative structure 
to overcome some of the fundamental issues confronting the traditional marketing-
cooperatives without abandoning the principles of collective action. 
New generation co-ops (NGCs) are similar to traditional marketing cooperatives 
in that: 
  Only farmers can be voting members; 
  Governance is on the basis of one-member, one-vote; 
  Stock dividends may not exceed 8 percent per year; 
The value of products handled for members exceeds that of non-members; and 
Earnings are allocated to patrons on the basis of patronage. 
But they are also fundamentally different in: Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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 Focus - Traditional agricultural marketing associations usually seek to maximize 
the VOLUME of product handled.  NGCs seek to identify and obtain the volume of farm 
production that can be processed and sold consistently at a PROFIT. 
 Membership – Traditional cooperatives have ‘OPEN’ membership and seek to 
sign up the largest possible number of eligible producers.  NGSs have a limited or 
‘CLOSED’ membership.  Once eligible producers have contracted to deliver the desired 
level of product, the cooperative no longer solicits membership.  
  Member equity investment – Traditional cooperatives usually require a 
MINIMAL, uniform investment and equity is accumulated over time through retained 
earnings and per-unit retains.  NGCs require a SUBSTANTIAL upfront investment with 
individual investments differing in proportion to the member’s agreement to deliver 
feedstock to the association each year. 
 Equity  transferability – The upfront investment and member equity in a traditional 
cooperative can only be redeemed by selling it back to the co-op at FACE VALUE. 
NGC’s tie equity to the right to deliver product that may be resold to other co-op 
members or producers eligible to become members.  The transfer takes place at whatever 
PRICE IS NEGOTIATED between the two parties regardless of the price paid by the 
seller.  
The successful traditional marketing cooperative offers two principal benefits:  A 
home at a fair price for the members’ product; and patronage refunds at the end of a 
successful marketing year.  Additional benefits accrue to NGC members:   The option of 
cashing out their equity investment when they want to reduce or cease their dealings with 
the cooperative; and the opportunity to make capital gains on their equity investment.  
(Frederick, et al) 
 
 
The Case of Minnesota Corn Processors 
 
A proud beginning  
In the early 1980s, a revival swept across west central plains of Minnesota.   Corn 
and bean farmers found themselves caught up in the fever and excitement of something 
that was being called a number of things: “New Age,” “New Wave,” “New Generation.”  
And, while it may have had the earmarks, this was not a religious revival.  These ‘highly 
spirited’ meetings were being held in cafes and coffee shops from Clarkfield to Granite 
Falls.  And the ‘good news’ was being delivered by a state economic development 
specialist preaching a “gospel” of self-help and collective action.  (Powell, Star Tribune) 
In Marshall, Minnesota, a group of reasonably successful farmers formed a 
different kind of cooperative.  They saw an opportunity to link themselves to a value 
chain and intended to use a new type of cooperative to make some serious money for 
themselves and they set it up accordingly.  And they purposed to do a number of things 
differently this time around.    
For starters, they proposed not to undertake this new enterprise on the cheap as 
may have been done before with traditional marketing co-ops.  Every prospective 
member had to pony up a substantial investment, at least $10,300 in equity capital to 
build the plant.   
Second, they limited their membership to only those single-minded farmers who 
bought into the idea and had the wherewithal to make the initial investment.    Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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And for each share of stock the member purchased in that buy-in, he received the 
right and the obligation to deliver corn to the cooperative and a residual claim on the net 
returns of the cooperative. Also, their equity was tied to directly to those delivery rights 
which are transferable and promised to have a secondary market of their own. 
And in 1983 Minnesota Corn Processors opened for business, a $55m corn wet-
mill fuel-ethanol plant on the north side of Marshall built with 5,000 bushel investment 
increments, and a $1.9 tax increment financial assistance from the city.  
The co-op struggled to break even for the first 4 years or so.  By their on 
admission, they were just a bunch of farmers trying to find their way in a new business 
and for that matter, a new industry.  They had to first learn how to manufacture a product 
to a customer’s specifications, and they nearly went broke in the process.  
But by 1987 they had ramped up to nameplate capacity, worked the bugs out of 
their delivery system, and started to turn a profit.  And by that time even the state of 
Minnesota legislature was caught up in the excitement.  They saw public investment in 
farmer-owned fuel-ethanol plants as a positive way of supporting rural communities and 
developed a scheme to subsidize plants on a per-gallon basis.  And the cooperative 
agreed to add an ethanol still to their process.  Over the next 10 years, MCP received 
approximately $33m from the state of Minnesota.  
 
A “New Wave” flagship 
And so the state of Minnesota’s first, and to this day only, corn wet mill was fast 
becoming a great source of pride to a large number of people.  And rightly so, success 
has many fathers.  In an area rich in tradition of collective action, this new generation 
cooperative, the first of the “New Wave” experiments, was assuming a leadership 
position in a new industry, in its community and the state of Minnesota, and among 
farmer cooperatives.  And not only that, it was returning to its members some ‘real 
money.’ 
And make money they did.  For the next 7 years or so, and especially from ’91 
through ’95, the cooperative grew in locations, capacity, and prosperity.  The Columbus, 
Nebraska plant was added in ’91. Two separate expansions were undertaken in ’93 and 
’95. The ’95 expansion required the cooperative to borrow $124 to add high fructose corn 
syrup capacity.   
The cooperative was becoming a major player in the industry, standing among 
giants like Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland.  The value of their initial investment 
more than tripled. The stock appreciated from an initial offering price of $2.06 to $4.50 in 
the mid-‘90s.  And as a result of several stock splits in the mid-‘80s, charter members 
tripled their holdings, as well. There were reports of paper millionaires among initial 
investors during those halcyon days.   
 
“A fight for our lives” 
  The flagship was soon buffeted about by some very heavy seas and began take on 
water.  Market shocks, predatory behavior, and a glaring oversight in the cooperative’s 
operations, all combined in ’96 to give MCP a very hard lesson on the realities of being a 
major player in the commodity manufacturing business.  In the words of their board 
chairman, “forget all the warm, fuzzy buzzwords of ‘farmer-owned,’ ‘value-added.’   We 
were in a fight for our lives.” (Powell, Star Tribune) Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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  Cost overruns from the ’95 expansion surely made for a rough start to ’96.  But 
the cooperative’s real difficulties began with the winter drought and subsequent rise in 
corn prices.  The drought persisted.  Corn prices skyrocketed.  And having no hedging 
strategy to lock in its offering price to members, MCP was especially exposed to the 
almost doubling of its feed stock costs.  
Grain marketers traditionally use the futures market to protect themselves against 
major price movements.  MCP however, believed that because its members were 
contractually obligated to deliver grain, that the market assurances offered by a hedging 
operation were, if not a complete redundancy, surely an extravagance.  They were wrong 
on both counts. 
 
“Too many pigs at the same trough” 
Were the price of either ethanol or fructose tied to their respective cost of 
production, the cooperative may have been able to pass a portion of its higher costs on to 
its customers.  However, product prices were, if anything, inversely related to production 
costs in ‘96, as MCP and all market participants discovered.  And fructose market 
conditions were not the least bit improved to U.S. sellers, MCP included, when Mexico 
chose to close its borders HFC imports in order to shore up its own market later that year.   
  But the worst blows may have come at the hands of one of their own.  Corn 
fructose prices really went into a tailspin with the arrival of another competitor in the 
already saturated market. It’s hard to imagine a more untimely opening of the $261mil 
ProGold Corn Sweetener plant in Wahpeton, North Dakota; and by another group of 
collectively-acting farmers no-less.  Just how unfortunate these circumstances were was 
made clear when ProGold was forced to form an alliance with Cargill, who soon acquired 
them outright, and fructose prices went into a 2 year depression.  
In the words of a board member MCP, “ended ’96 with an Upside down balance 
sheet.”  The cooperative realized net losses of $63m, had acquired long term debts in 
excess of $410m, and its bankers were demanding payment. (Powell, Star Tribune) 
 
“Too many buzzards sitting on the fence” 
By early ’97 it was clear that MCP was in need of more than an emotional rescue.  
The cooperative needed if not a savior, certainly a sympathetic partner to help pay their 
bills and get them through this very tight spot.  There was no shortage of interested 
parties.  A traffic jam of corporate jets carrying “Angels,“ soon littered the skies above 
Southwest Minnesota Regional Airport in Marshall.  Among the most prominent 
candidates that came a-courting, Cargill was perceived by the MCP board as wanting too 
much control and A.E. Staley Mfg. of Illinois, didn’t have the cash on hand that MCP 
needed in pretty short order.  However, the MCP board seemed to warm immediately to 
ADM’s chief.  Duane Andreas was seen as, “Calm, well-spoken, down-to-earth, and easy 
to deal with.” (Powell, Star Tribune) 
 
Rescued by an Angel? 
Mr. Andreas and ADM came to MCP’s rescue in ’97. The MCP board chose ADM as 
the best possible suitor because for the $120m. in cash that the cooperative received to 
pay its bankers, ADM received 30 percent of MCP’s stock and asked for a very limited 
oversight privilege; ADM wanted to be consulted before any major capital investments 
were undertaken.  Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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With its bankers appeased, corn prices returning to normal levels, and the modest 
recovery of the fructose and ethanol markets, MCP began to turn things around in ’99 
with significant gains in revenue and net returns.  And with continued progress in the 
next two years, MCP was able to report modest net returns and reduce its long debt by 40 
percent to $245m. 
 
Or a dance with the Devil?   
Also during its recovery, a significant but relatively unnoticed transformation 
occurred in the cooperative’s legal structure and by-laws.  In’00, the New Venture 
cooperative went through an entanglement of legal procedures to convert from a 
Minnesota Cooperative to a Colorado Limited Liability Company.  The reason given was 
for “tax purposes.”   MCP also revalued its stock at $1.02 per share along the way.  
The corporate jets returned on April 22, 2002.  They weren’t bearing Angels this time 
however, but teams of legal and financial experts from New York and ADM 
headquarters.  The event was a regularly scheduled board meeting with ethanol and 
fructose prices on the agenda.  But this meeting turned out to be anything but routine.   A 
month earlier, ADM had tendered an offer to purchase MCP outright.  And the CEO was 
now presenting the offer to the board with the following imperative, “Gentlemen, shut 
your briefcases and please do not take notes of this meeting.”  
The board was now being asked, absent any involved discussion, to approve the deal.  
There were implications and vague threats of law suits issued to any director who might 
publicly voice opposition and “Queer the deal” with slanderous remarks.    
Each board member was asked point blank if he had hired representation or discussed 
any financial details prior to this meeting.  But how could they have?  The directors had 
been completely shut out of the loop regarding the offer.  By several accounts, the whole 
atmosphere was one of intimidation and coercion.  One director made an issue of 
expressing that he had a fiduciary responsibility to the stockholders and was told he 
would be escorted off the premises by the sheriff for trespassing.  
More than one member remarked that ADM’s intentions in’97 were to buy the plant 
and that the last 4 years were just an extended use of due-diligence.  Andreas’ remarks at 
the time make such intentions hard to refute, “MCP’s long suit is 2 well-designed, low-
cost, low-emission plants.” (Powell, Star Tribune) 
 
MCP “Golden Parachute” Club 
Surely the progress of the deal itself or its favor among the principals wasn’t 
hindered by the alleged sweetheart payment to be distributed at the time of sale. A 
reported $8.5m, was awarded at sale and the amount was doubled if the sale went through 
by a specified date.  A total of $20m in accelerated pensions was distributed among the 8 
executives, and $385k paid immediately to the CEO upon merger.  (Powell, Star Tribune; 
Losure, MPC NEWS) 
 
This “New Age” Co-Op has an Age Old Problem 
Incentive payments aside, the motivation to sell MCP was more fundamental.  
Given the cooperative’s near-death experience in ’97, its heavy debt burden, and struggle 
to pay returns, it’s easy to appreciate that members might be having second thoughts 
regarding their investment.  Moreover, the secondary market in MCP shares, by all 
evidence was non existent; a detail duly noted among a majority of the stockholders that Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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were at or approaching retirement age. Members seeking to cash out of the cooperative 
had to be especially resourceful.  First that member had to find another stockholder who 
was willing to purchase his/her equity at current prices, which meant that the buyer 
wasn’t actively planning his/her own retirement. Or the seller had to seek a non-member 
seeking membership who also had the wherewithal to do so in these cash-straightened 
times. Under the economic circumstances of recent years, low corn prices, large 
indebtedness, finding prospective members both willing and able to buy into the 
cooperative was difficult at best.  Many members had even borrowed the capital to buy 
into MCP.   
Dan Thompson, MCP’s CEO, said it this way, “We’ve got a lot of members that in 
their 50’s invested in this company. They can’t sell their stock, there’s no liquidity.  Now 
they’re 75 years old and so forth, they want to cash out.  They need cash for retirement 
purposes and have no way to do it.”  (Losure, MPC NEWS) 
To sum up, stockholder-members of MCP shared these circumstances:  their per-
member investment was substantial, at least $10,240, some had invested hundreds of 
thousands of dollars; they were in a ‘cooperative’ with a closed-membership policy, very 
few of the member firms were legally incorporated, there was a large membership, and 
ownership transfer, either intergenerational or otherwise was relatively prohibited.  All 
conditions for an EXTREME horizon problem were satisfied.  How could management 
not then feel extreme pressure to: Increase cash flow to current payments, either by 
speeding up equity retirement programs, or liquidating the cooperative’s assets in whole 
or in part? 
 
A Missed Silver Anniversary  
The Membership speaks 
  Either by hook, the felt pressure from their membership, or by crook, the implied 
coercion from MCP’s principals, the Board voted 19-5 in favor of bringing the decision 
to sell MCP to ADM to the membership for a vote.  The terms of the sale were that ADM 
offered to purchase individual shares of MCP stock for $2.90/share, a total of $396m and 
ADM was to assume MCP’s remaining debt of $240m  The shareholders voted 
conclusively 3,825 to 736 (84  to 16 percent of voting members) in favor of the sale. 
(Associated Press)  
  The enterprise value of the sale was about $760m, based on the cash amount, the 
30 percent equity already owned by ADM, and the agreed upon debt assumption.    
  
The Department of Justice rules 
Antitrust concerns were raised by the merger of the No.1 and No.2 producers of 
ethanol and HFC would lessen competition substantially in their manufacture. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Sept. 2002)  In July ’03 the Department of Justice ruled in favor of 
sale on the provision that a joint-venture with a competitor was dissolved. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Sept. 2003)   
 
And the Minnesota Legislature whines 
Some Minnesota lawmakers, frustrated by the state’s provision of $33m in 
ethanol-producer subsidies to MCP to watch it become acquired by ADM, complained 
that they wanted a refund.  At last account however, no one was sure about what 
recourse, if any, the state might have. (Powell, Star Tribune) Crooks -- The Horizon Problem and New Generation Cooperatives  
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